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研究ノート 
 
Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach 
 
Hiroyuki KATO 
 
 
＜Abstract＞ 
This paper presents two players' equilibrium model in which bubbles of security prices occur in finite 
time even when both players know that the prices are bubbles. We firstly describe a Bayesian model 
with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon (2004, Econometrica) and secondly extends it 
to non-Bayesian setting in which players cannot identify the true probability but a set of probabilities 
with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon contamination. We proved that in non-Bayesian approach 
asymmetry of information is not necessary for the existence of bubbles and that bubble prices rise 
more steeply than those in Bayesian.  
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1 Introduction 
The bubbles of securities are deﬁned as prices larger than the discounted present values of dividends. 
Because every player rationally needs to sell these assets before terminal, this phenomenon is difficult 
to describe as equilibrium models. Many researchers have tackled this problem in a variety of 
approaches. Among others, Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) describe a situation where all players 
know that the securities are bubble but each player does not know that other players know that, and 
proved that bubbles occur even in ﬁnite time model in the presence of asymmetric information. 
Conlon (2004) clariﬁed their model in only two players and succeeded in dropping the assumption that 
trade pattern must be common knowledge. These researches so far presume that all players know the 
true probability, which is named Bayesian approach and are based on asymmetric information.  
In this paper, we take another approach that all players cannot identify a single probability, which is 
called non-Bayesian approach or ‘ambiguity’ setting compared to the notion of ‘risk’, which usually 
refers to the situation where the true probability is known. We employ in this context the 
epsilon-contamination that is a special case of ambiguity. Several authors have examined the 
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epsilon-contamination or its variants in search behavior (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2004), irreversible 
investment (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007) and axiomatization (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2006) to name 
only a few. In a ﬁnite time, two players model with ambiguity we show that bubbles occur without 
asymmetry of information and that prices of bubbles rise more steeply than those in Bayesian. 
Main contributions in this paper are three folds. One is the clarification of the Conlon (2004) in the 
sense that the probability in our paper is set as a general variable p∈(0, 1) contrary to the specific 
p=1/2 in his paper. Second is that under the ambiguity aversion the equilibrium prices more steeply 
increase than those in Bayesian, which may be useful to explain sharp rises of security prices in reality. 
Thirdly, we confirm that if the probability includes the states that they expect to occur but do not 
realize, a symmetry of information is not necessary for assuring the existence of bubbles even when 
both players still know that prices are bubbles. This paper treats both the second and the third 
contributions under the same ambiguity aversion setting.  
Logical relation between Bayesian in which the true probability is known and the approach where 
players have less information is as follows. To assume smaller amount of information or larger one is 
an alternative approach and either assumption is not stronger nor weaker assumption mathematically. 
What we concern is the scope of phenomena that we can explain. This paper mainly finds by taking 
another approach that different prices can be observed as equilibrium bubbles even when both players 
know that prices are bubbles. 
The next section describes a Bayesian model with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon 
(2004). The third section provides non-Bayesian model with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon 
contamination. The last section offers concluding remark.   
 
2 Bayesian Model with Asymmetric Information 
Time is assumed to be discrete and written as t = 0, 1, 2, · · · T where T is ﬁnite. Let (Ω, F, P) be a 
probability space. Denote the stochastic process of the security by {St }t=0,1,2, ···T : Ω → R+  where R+ 
stands for the set of non-negative real numbers. Let q ∈(0, 1) be a probability of collapse of bubble 
price of the security to zero at t = 0,1, · · · T − 1. Let p + q = 1. Because in this paper we only 
consider the case of bubbles, let us assume that the probability of collapse at t = T equals one. Let b > 
1, which is more speciﬁed later. Deﬁne the price of security as follows1; (S0, S1, · · · , ST-1, ST )=(1, b, b2, 
· · · bT-1, 0) with probability pT-1 , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with probability ptq for t = 1, 2, · · · ,T – 
2,  (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q. In this paper xt or xi means x to the power of t or i. Same 
arguments apply to the similar notations. Notice that q +∑  𝑇𝑇−2𝑡𝑡=1 ptq + pT-1 = 1 holds. 
                                                          
1 For example, if T = 4,  
(S0, S1, S2, S3, S4 )=(1, b, b2, b3, 0) with probability p3 , (1, b, b2, 0, 0) with probability p2q, (1, b, 0, 0, 0) 
with probability pq, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with probability q. 
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The bubble of security is defined by the security price St large than the discounted present value of 
dividends. In this paper, obeying Conlon (2004), interest rates and dividends are assumed to be zero 
for simplicity. Thus we can say that the bubble of security occurs when St > 0 holds for some t. 
Because S0=1, the above security prices involve bubbles. 
Let us specify the probability space (Ω, F, P) such that for i = 0, · · ·, T−1, 
Ai := {ω∈ Ω | (S0, S1, · · · , ST-1, ST ) = (1, b, b2, · · · , bi, 0, · · · ,0, 0) }, 
P(A0) =q,        P(Ai) = piq,  i = 1, · · · T – 2,        P(AT-1) = pT-1, 
and 
F0 := {∅, Ω},     Ft := {A0, A1,  · · · , At-1, ⋃  𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡 Ai },      t = 1, · · · T – 1, 
F := FT-1. 
Namely, Ai represents the set of states on which the bubble continues until t=i. Ft stands for the 
information available at t so that players can discern whether St is bt or 0 but cannot know St+1 yet.  
Consider the following problem; 
                  max EP [mT ] 
subject to 
Stat+1 + mt+1 = Stat + mt,    t = 0, 1, 2,· · ·, T, 
      at, mt ≥ 0 and at, mt ∈N 
a0 = 1,   m0 ≥ 1,  given, 
where at stands for the number of securities and mt represents the quantity of money, which is riskless 
asset. at, mt ≥ 0 means that short sales are prohibited following Allen et al (1993) and Conlon (2004), 
at and mt take only natural number (N stands for the set of natural numbers), and each player has one 
security. 
 
 Define 
b = 
1
𝑝𝑝
 ,                                      (1) 
namely, the security prices for the sates where bubbles do not collapse are defined by 
                              St=(1/p)t 
for t=1, · · ·, T-1. 
 
Set Δat+1 := at+1 −at for t = 0, 1, · · · T. Then we can write from ST = 0 and S0 = 1,  
mT = ST (−ΔaT+1) + ST-1(−ΔaT ) + ST-2(−ΔaT-1) · · · + S1(−Δa2) + S0(−Δa1) + m0 
= ST-1(−ΔaT ) + ST-2(−ΔaT-1) · · · + S1(−Δa2) + (−Δa1) + m0. 
Since at is Ft-1 measurable, we can write 
at(ω) = att   if ω∈ ⋃  𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡−1  Ai,,   
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 at(ω) = ati+1  if ω∈ Ai  for i = 0,· · · , t − 2. 
for t = 2; ・ ・ ・ T  while a1 is deterministic. So together with the fact that St-1 is Ft-1 measurable, we 
see 
EP [St-1Δat] = bt-1Δatt { pT-1 +∑ 	்ିଶ௜ୀ௧ିଵ piq }+ 0∑ 	௧ିଶ௜ୀ଴ Δati+1{piq}   
= bt-1Δatt pt-1                                            (†) 
=Δatt 
Then we have 
EP [mT ] = −ΔaTT− ΔaT-1T-1 , · · · ,− Δa22− Δa1 + m0. 
Since there are two players and they have only one security, one can reach Δatt= −1 by selling one 
security at t. On the other hand, Δatt= −2 obtained by selling two must accompany Δass= +1 by buying 
one for some s<t. Likewise, Δatt= −3 obtained by selling three must accompany Δass= +2 by buying 
two for some s<t, and so on. Therefore we find 
 max EP [mT ] = 1 + m0. 
 
Asymmetric Information: Assume that the signal s ∈{1, · · ·, T − 2} is sent to player 1, which 
makes his or her know that the bubble continues at longest until t=s and collapses afterwards t>s, 
namely, the ‘conditional’ probability player 1 envisions is;  (S0, S1, · · · , ST-1, ST )=(1, b, b2, · · ·, bs, 0, · 
· ·, 0) with probability ps , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with probability ptq for t = 1, 2, · · · ,s – 1,  (1, 
0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q, while signal s + 1 ∈ {2, · · ·, T − 1} is sent to player 2, which 
informs his or her that the bubble proceeds at most until s+1. The `conditional’ probability of player 2 
is defined by replacing s in the case of player 1 with s + 1. 
 According to the asymmetric assumption, player 1 knows the timing of collapse of bubbles one 
period ahead of that player 2 knows. 
 
 The methods that the signal s constructs the above conditional probability can be considered in 
various ways. This paper offers one method because we are only interested in the consequential 
conditional probability exhibited above. Let Bi, Ci be disjoint measurable sets such that Ai = Bi∪Ci and 
P(Bi) = piq(1−p), P(Ci) = pi+1q. The signal s makes a player know that he or she stays within As∪
[⋃ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Bi ]⊂⋃ 	்ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Ai sharpening the information from ⋃ 	்ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Ai. Thus we can confirm that the 
conditional probabilities induced from the signal are as follows; 
 
P(B0 | As ∪[⋃ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Bi ] ) := q(1-p) 	 	⁄  [psq +∑ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ piq(1 − p)]=q 
P(Bi | As ∪[⋃ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Bi ] ) := piq(1-p) 	 	⁄  [psq +∑ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ piq(1 − p)]= piq,  i = 1, · · · ,s – 1,  
P(As | As ∪[⋃ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ Bi ] ) := psq 	 	⁄  [psq +∑ 	௦ିଵ௜ୀ଴ piq(1 − p)]= ps. 
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Namely, Bi represents the set of states on which the bubble continues until t=i with conditional 
probability defied above. Hence we see that under player 1’s conditional probability;  (S0, S1, · · · , ST-1, 
ST )=(1, b, b2, · · ·, bs, 0, · · ·, 0) with probability ps , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with probability ptq 
for t ≤s – 1,  (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q, and under player 2’s conditional probability;  (S0, 
S1, · · · , ST-1, ST )=(1, b, b2, · · ·, bs+1, 0, · · ·, 0) with probability ps+1 , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with 
probability ptq for t ≤s, (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q. 
 
This setting is a slight extension of Conlon (2004) that considers only the case of p = q = 1/2 while in 
this paper p and q are put arbitrarily. 
 
Denote the conditional expectation under signal s, EP [ mT | As∪[⋃  𝑠𝑠−1𝑖𝑖=0 Bi ] ], by simply EP [ mT | s ]. 
Therefore by obeying the preceding calculations, we have 
 
EP [ mT | s ] =−Δass−Δas-1s-1,  · · ·  , −Δa22−Δa1 + m0. 
 
So similarly to the previous discussion, we obtain 
                       max EP [ mT | s ] = 1 + m0. 
The logic of max EP [ mT | s + 1 ] = 1 + m0 follows in similar way.  
 
 Now let us write the formal definition of the equilibrium. 
 
Definition.  An equilibrium of this economy is a set of stochastic processes 
{at, 1, mt,1, at, 2, mt, 2 (St )}t=0, 1, 2,· · ·, T 
such that 
(e-1) given {St}, {at, i, mt, i} solves the player i’s problem for i=1,2;  
(e-2) the security market clears; at,1+ at,2 = 2; in other words, with a0,1=1 and a0,2=1 it holds that Δat, 
1+Δat, 2=0 for t ≥1 and –2≤ Δat, i ≤2 for i=1,2; 
(e-3) the money market clears; mt,1+ mt,2 = m0. 
 
Note that it suffices to prove (e-1) and (e-2) only because the summing up each players’ budget 
constrains deduces (e-3) provided that (e-2) holds (Walras’s Law). 
 For brevity, we abbreviate player’s notation i in what follows.  
 
We can see that the equilibrium arises within As∪[⋃  𝑠𝑠−1𝑖𝑖=0 Bi ] by the following way (recall (†)): 
The case of s = 1 
48  嘉悦大学研究論集 第60巻第2号通巻112号 平成30年3月 
player 1: Δa1=−1 (selling one) doing nothing afterwards. 
player 2: Δa1=1 (buying one) anticipating Δa22=−2 (selling two for price (1/p) with probability p) or 
Δa21= 0 (doing nothing otherwise) but selling (Δa22=−2 ) is not executed ex post. 
 
The case of s = 2 
player 1: Δa1 = 1 (buying one), and Δa22=−2 (selling two for price (1/p) with probability p) or Δa21= 0 
(doing nothing otherwise) doing nothing afterwards. 
player 2: Δa1=−1 (selling one), and Δa22=−2 (selling two for price (1/p) with probability p) or Δa21= 0 
(doing nothing otherwise) anticipating Δa33=−2 (selling two for price (1/p)2 with probability p2) or 
Δa32= 0 (doing nothing otherwise) but selling (Δa33=−2) is not executed ex post. 
· · · · · · 
Generally, player 1 sells at most securities at t = s and player 2 buys them anticipating selling them at t 
= s+1 but fails to undertake ex post satisfying maxEP [mT |s] = 1 + m0  and maxEP [mT |s +1] = 1 + m0. 
 
In effect, we can summarize the above discussion as the existence theorem; 
 
Theorem 1. There exists an equilibrium under each signal s with Bayesian setting. 
 
 To make the reader more easily understand the outlook of equilibrium, let us provide a numerical 
example, which is different from Conlon (2004) as follows. 
 
Numerical Example. Let T = 4 and p=1/3. Then b=3. So we see that the price process is: (S0, S1, S2, 
S3, S4 )=(1, 3, 9, 27, 0) with probability 1/27, (1, 3, 9, 0, 0) with probability 2/27, (1, 3, 0, 0, 0) with 
probability 2/9, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/3.  
The player 1 receives signal s=3 and player 2 obtains s=4. Thus, for player 1, the price process is (S0, 
S1, S2, S3, S4 )=(1, 3, 9, 0, 0) with probability 1/9, (1, 3, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/9, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with 
probability 2/3, and, for player 2, (S0, S1, S2, S3, S4 )= (1, 3, 9, 27, 0) with probability 1/27 , (1, 3, 9, 0, 
0) with probability 2/27, (1, 3, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/9, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/3. The 
form of equilibrium is the following:  
Period 0. player 1 sells one security to player 2 at price 1; The gain: player 1; +1 and player 2; −1. 
Period 1. player 1 buys two securities from player 2 when price 3 and does nothing when price 0; 
The gain: player 1; 2×−3×(1/9+2/9)+0×2/3=−2 and player 2; 2×3×(1/27+2/27+2/9)+0×2/3=+2. 
Period 2. player 1 sells two securities to player 2 when price 9 and does nothing when price 0; The 
gain: player 1; 2×9×1/9+0×(2/9+2/3)=+2 and player 2; 2×−9×(1/27+2/27)+0×(2/9+2/3)= −2. 
Period 3. Player 1 knows that the bubble collapse so does nothing while player 2 anticipates selling 
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two securities to player 1 when price 27 and does nothing when price 0; The gain: player 2; 
2×−27×1/27+0×(2/27+2/9+2/3)= +2. 
In effect, the expected total gain of player 1 other than m0 equals +1−2+2=1, and that of player 2 is 
−1+2−2+2=1, which are the maximal of players. 
 
3 Non-Bayesian Model with Ambiguity Aversion 
In this section, we consider the case that the players don’t know the true probability and only have a 
set of probabilities. Let us modify the true probability as follows; (S0, S1, · · · , ST-1, ST , ST+1 )=(1, b, b2, 
· · · , bT-1, 0, 0) with probability pT-1 , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with probability ptq for t = 1, 2, · · 
· ,T – 2,  (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q. 
Set the probability Q whose domain is extended from the true probability P as follows; (S0, S1, · · · , 
ST-1, ST , ST+1 )=(1, b, b2, · · · bT, 0) with probability pT , (1, b, b2, · · · , bt, 0, · · · , 0, 0) with probability 
ptq for t = 1, 2, · · · ,T – 1,  (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) with probability q. In Q players optimistically expect that 
bubbles last one period longer than the true phenomena. In effect, Q includes the states that do not 
realize. Next we perturb this probability Q. Let ε> 0 with p-ε> 0 and ηk ∈ (–ε,ε),  k = 1, · · · , T. 
Write η = (η1, · · · ,ηT ). The new probability Qη is defined by perturbing Q in the way that Qη(Ai) 
={∏  𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk)}(q –ηi+1), Qη(AT ) =∏  𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk), ∑  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=0 Qη(Ai) = 1 and Qη(Ai)∈(0, 1) for i = 0, · · 
· ,T. Note that if p is perturbed to p+ηt, q is changed to q−ηt. The set of sates AT does not really occur 
but players take into consideration in view of the probability Q. Denote the set of all perturbed 
probabilities that meet the above conditions by Mε. From construction, all players know that prices are 
bubbles.  
Consider the following problem; 
maxmT min Qη∈MεE Qη[mT ] 
subject to 
Stat+1 + mt+1 = Stat + mt,    t = 0, 1, 2,· · ·, T+1, 
at, mt ≥ 0 and at, mt ∈N 
a0 = 1,   m0 ≥ 1,  given. 
Define 
                                b= 
1
𝑝𝑝−𝛆𝛆
                                       (2) 
namely, the security prices for the sates where bubbles do not collapse are defined by 
                              St={1/(p−ε)}t 
for t=1, · · ·, T-1. 
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We can calculate as follows; 
 E Qη[St-1Δat] = bt-1Δatt { ∏  𝑇𝑇 𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk) +∑  [𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡−1 ∏  𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk)] (q–ηi+1) } 
+ 0∑  𝑡𝑡−2𝑖𝑖=0 Δati+1{ [∏  𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk)] (q–ηi+1) }   
= bt-1Δatt ∏  𝑡𝑡−1 𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk),                                 (††) 
with the convention of ∏  0 𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk)=1. Then we obtain, 
E Qη[mT ] =− bTΔaT+1T+1 ∏  𝑇𝑇 𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk)− bT-1ΔaTT ∏  𝑇𝑇−1 𝑘𝑘=1 (p +ηk) , · · ·  
· · · , − b2Δa33(p +η2)(p +η1) − bΔa22 (p +η1) −Δa1 + m0. 
The players select at under which η is determined so as to minimize EQη[mT ]. Taking into account the 
dependence of η, the players choose at so as to maximize EQη[mT ].  Although ηk needs to be as high 
as possible (pessimistically anticipating buying high prices) if players select buying, Δat > 0, they can 
compensate its minus by selling, Δat < 0, in which case ηk must be as low as possible, namely, ηk = −ε. 
However, buying one security needs to precede selling two securities. Consider buying one at t = 1 
and selling two at t = 2, which yields 
min η1,η2 [ + b22(p +η2)(p +η1)− b(p +η1)  
= b(p +η1){2b(p +η2) − 1} ] 
= b(p−ε){2b(p−ε) − 1} = 1, 
since 2b(p−ε)−1 > 0 (recall b = 1/ (p−ε)). The case of selling only one and buying one is inferior to 1 
due to b(p−ε)−1 = 0. In the case of timing other than t = 1, 2, similar arguments apply since 2bi(p 
−ε)i−1> 0 for i ≥ 2. To see this, consider buying two at t = 3 and selling two at t = 4, which yields 
min η1,η2,η3,η4 [ + b42(p +η4)(p +η3) (p +η2)(p +η1)− 2b3(p +η3) (p +η2) (p +η1)  
= 2b3(p +η3) (p +η2) (p +η1){b(p +η4) − 1} ] 
= 2b3(p−ε)3{b(p−ε) − 1} =0, 
since b(p−ε) −1=0. In the case of timing other than t = 3, 4, similar arguments apply since bi(p−ε)i −1 
= 0 for i ≥ 2. Therefore we have 
 maxmT min Qη∈MεE Qη[mT ]=1+m0. 
 
 The definition of equilibrium in non-Bayesian setting inherits that of the previous section. 
Then we can see that the equilibrium arises even without asymmetric information in the following 
way (recall (††)); 
 
The case that T is even. 
player 1: Δa1 = 1 (buying one), and Δa22=−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε)) with probability p−ε) 
or Δa12= 0 (doing nothing otherwise), and Δa33= 2 (buying two for price (1/(p−ε))2 with probability 
(p−ε)2) or Δa32= 0 (doing nothing otherwise), and Δa44=−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε))3 with 
probability (p−ε)3) or Δa43= 0 (doing nothing otherwise) 
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・ ・ ・ 
and ΔaT-1T-1 = 2 (buying two for price (1/(p−ε))T-2 with probability (p−ε)
T-2) or ΔaT-1T-2 = 0 (doing 
nothing otherwise), and ΔaTT=−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε))T-1 with probability (p−ε)
T-1) or ΔaTT-1 
= 0 (doing nothing otherwise). That amounts to the repetition of a couple of (buying, selling) totaling 
T (even number, 0≤t≤T-1) times of trading. 
 
 player 2: player 1’s ‘buying’ is replaced with ‘selling’, and ‘selling’ with ‘buying’ for t = 0, · · · , T − 
1. In addition, player 2 anticipates at t = T, ΔaT+1T+1 =−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε))T with 
probability (p−ε)T) or ΔaT+1T = 0 (doing nothing otherwise)  but selling cannot be executed because 
the occurrence of this state is misunderstood by player 2. That amounts to first selling plus the 
repetition of a couple of (buying, selling) totaling T+1 (odd number, 0≤t≤T) times of (anticipated) 
trading. 
 
The case that T is odd. 
player 1: Δa1 = 1 (buying one), and Δa22=−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε)) with probability p−ε) 
or Δa12= 0 (doing nothing otherwise), and Δa33= 2 (buying two for price (1/(p−ε))2 with probability 
(p−ε)2) or Δa32= 0 (doing nothing otherwise), and Δa44=−2 (selling two for price (1/(p−ε))3 with 
probability (p−ε)3) or Δa43= 0 (doing nothing otherwise) 
・ ・ ・ 
and ΔaTT = 2 (buying two for price (1/(p−ε))T-1 with probability (p−ε)
T-1) or ΔaT-1T-2 = 0 (doing 
nothing otherwise). In addition, player 1 anticipates at t = T, ΔaT+1T+1 =−2 (selling two for price 
(1/(p−ε))T with probability (p−ε)T) or ΔaT+1T = 0 (doing nothing otherwise)  but selling cannot be 
executed because the occurrence of this state is misunderstood by player 1. That amounts to the 
repetition of a couple of (buying, selling) totaling T+1 (even number, 0≤t≤T) times of (anticipated) 
trading. 
 
 player 2: player 1’s ‘buying’ is replaced with ‘selling’, and ‘selling’ with ‘buying’ for t = 0, · · · , T − 
1. That amounts to first selling plus the repetition of a couple of (buying, selling) totaling T (odd 
number, 0≤t≤T-1) times of trading. 
 
In that process of equilibrium, both players satisfy max minEP [mT ] = 1+m0. Note that the role of 
player 1 and 2 is interchangeable because both players do not differ in information. 
 
In effect, we can summarize the above discussion as the existence theorem; 
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Theorem 2. There exists an equilibrium with non-Bayesian setting. 
 
To make the reader more easily understand the outlook of equilibrium under ambiguity aversion 
setting, let us provide a numerical example as follows. 
 
Numerical Example. Let T = 4 (even case), p=1/3 and ε=1/4. Then b=12 (from 1/{1/3−1/4}). Note 
that b=3 in the Bayesian case. So we see that the price process is: (S0, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 )=(1, 12, 144, 
1728, 0, 0) with probability 1/27, (1, 12, 144, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/27, (1, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0) with 
probability 2/9, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2/3.  
The player 1 and 2 both think the price process as (S0, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 )=(1, 12, 144, 1728, 20736, 0) 
with probability around 1/81, (1, 12, 144, 1728, 0, 0) with probability around 2/81, (1, 12, 144, 0, 0, 0) 
with probability around 2/27, (1, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0) with probability around 2/9, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) with 
probability around 2/3. Each probabilities are ambiguous, which is connoted in the expression 
‘around’. The form of equilibrium is the following:  
Period 0. player 2 sells one security to player 1 at price 1; player 1: −1 and player 2: +1. 
Period 1. player 2 buys two securities from player 1 when price 12 with probability 1/12 and does 
nothing when price 0 with some probability; player 1: 2×12×1/12+0×some probability=+2 and player 
2: 2×−12×1/12+0×some probability=−2. 
 Period 2. player 2 sells two securities to player 1 when price 144 with probability 1/144 and does 
nothing when price 0 with some probability; player 1: 2×−144×1/144+0×some probability=−2 and 
player 2: 2×144×1/144+0×some probability= +2. 
Period 3. player 2 buys two securities from player 1 when price 1728 with probability 1/1728 and 
does nothing when price 0 with some probability; player 1: 2×1728×1/1728+0×some probability=+2  
and player 2: 2×−1728×1/1728+0×some probability=−2 (anticipating selling two securities to player 
1 at period 4 when price 20736 with probability 1/20736 and does nothing when price 0 with some 
probability, so expects to obtain 2×20736×1/20736+0×some probability= +2). 
Period 4. Bubble collapses so that player 2 cannot realize his or her expectation. 
 In effect, the expected total gain of player 1 other than m0 equals −1+2−2+2=1, and that of player 2 
is +1−2+2−2+2=1, which are the maximal of players. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This paper presents two players’ equilibrium model in which bubbles of security prices occur in finite 
time even when both players know that the prices are bubbles. We describe a Bayesian model with 
asymmetric information and its extension to non-Bayesian setting in which players cannot identify the 
true probability but a set of probabilities with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon contamination. 
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We described a Bayesian model with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon (2004) but 
more general setting in the sense that the probability of collapsing of bubbles is not specific in our 
paper while that of Conlon is set to one-half, and proved that in non-Bayesian approach asymmetry of 
information is not necessary for the existence of bubbles. We also see by comparing (1) and (2) that 
bubble prices rise more steeply than those in Bayesian. 
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